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The book’s primary focus is the relentless twenty-one-day fight to Baghdad by
the Marines on the right flank and the
Army on the left flank. Purdum excels
in tying together all the resulting reporting. What emerges is a factual and
very human account of the intense
ground campaign. Included are events
of 23 March, which saw the ambush of
the 507th Maintenance Company and
the devastating losses suffered by the
11th Attack Helicopter Regiment. The
brief campaign also saw some excellent
soldiering, such as the feint and race for
the Karbala Gap and the “Thunder
Run” armored thrusts into central
Baghdad. Ever the concise chronicler,
Purdum also discusses the northern
front that was opened by the airdrop of
a thousand paratroopers, and the operations conducted by the British in and
around Basra. Purdum weaves all this
together in such a way as to make this
work an excellent read for military professionals and armchair strategists alike.
It is a bit thin on the air and naval aspects of the war, due to the lack of threat
posed by the Iraqi air force and navy and
because the bulk of the embedded reporters accompanied ground units.
One of the successes of the program,
however, was how the reporting
brought out the human side of the war.
Purdum discusses numerous examples
of how the war directly affected such
individuals as the U.S. Army officer
who, after witnessing the results of an
air strike, commented, “It’s a helluva
thing watching people die,” or how an
Iraqi man, his hands swollen from recent beatings by Iraqi security forces,
emotionally thanked the Americans for
saving him.
The book’s main strength—its immediacy in telling the whole story of the
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conflict—is also a major drawback. Toward his conclusion, Purdum recounts
the events of July 2003 surrounding the
deaths of Saddam Hussein’s infamous
sons, Uday and Qusay. One of the vexing questions remaining was the whereabouts of Saddam Hussein. The
coalition would wonder about the fate
of the former Iraqi leader for another
five months. The book concludes before
Saddam’s capture in December.
Future historians and scholars will no
doubt revisit this war and debate endlessly on the merits of preemptive
self-defense, the effectiveness of the
coalition of the willing, and whether the
outcome achieved was the one desired.
For now, however, Todd Purdum’s A
Time of Our Choosing will more than
suffice as the first draft of history.
D. L. TESKA

U. S. Transportation Command
Scott Air Force Base, Illinois

Bush, Richard C. At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan
Relations since 1942. Armonk, New York: M. E.
Sharpe, 2004. 320pp. $27.95

For years, “one China” has meant two
completely different Chinas masquerading as one country—the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan
(a.k.a. the Republic of China [ROC]).
The PRC is huge, with a population of
1.3 billion, while Taiwan has only
twenty-two million people in comparison. There are other differences as well:
Taiwan is rich, with a per capita income
in 2003 of over $23,000, versus the
PRC’s per capita $5,000; Taiwan’s 5
percent unemployment rate is half, its 1
percent poverty rate is a tenth, and its
seventy-seven-year life expectancy is
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five years more than those of the PRC.
More importantly, during the past decade Taiwan adopted a multiparty
democracy, while the PRC has only
one legal political party that is holding
tightly onto its autocratic powers—the
Chinese Communist Party.
How can two such divergent Chinas
possibly reunite? What role has the
United States played in their sixty-year
standoff? These are the questions that
Richard C. Bush, former chairman and
managing director (September 1997 to
June 2002) of the American Institute in
Taiwan (AIT—the pseudo–American
embassy in Taipei), asks in At Cross
Purposes.
Bush starts with an extremely useful
historical summary of the origins of the
PRC-Taiwan problem. He asks, for example, what would have happened if
Chiang Kai-shek had not requested in
1942–43 that Japan cede Taiwan to
China. Would there even be a PRCTaiwan problem today? After all, China
at one point considered, then rejected,
demanding Okinawa as well. If circumstances had been different, could Taiwan have remained a part of Japan or a
UN protectorate, or even been given its
independence?
Bush argues that the great powers’ (the
United States, the United Kingdom,
and China) decision at Cairo to return
Taiwan to China was the real origin of
the “one China” problem, even though
cross-strait tensions did not erupt until
after the Nationalist retreat from the
mainland in 1949. To this day, the PRC
takes this World War II decision very
seriously. For example, from 21 to 26
July 1995, the PRC marked the fiftieth
anniversary of the July 1945 Potsdam
Declaration, which confirmed the Cairo
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Decision, by lobbing “test” missiles off
Taiwan’s shores.
After World War II, the U.S. government quickly found itself in a dilemma,
since it appeared obliged to support the
repressive Kuomintang. February 28,
1947, was the beginning of the massacre
by the Nationalists, who arrested and
killed hundreds, perhaps thousands, of
Taiwanese; it was followed by an era
known as the “White Terror.” Nationalist repression on Taiwan continued
for more than three decades, until 10
December 1979 and the Kaohsiung Incident, which was the turning point in
Taiwan’s transition to democracy.
Following Washington’s decision to
recognize the People’s Republic of
China in 1978 (part of America’s Cold
War strategy aimed at the Soviet
Union), Taipei’s increasing dependence
on Washington for security actually
gave the United States greater leverage
to sponsor democratic reforms. Thus,
quixotically, democratic reforms in Taiwan appear to have been spurred rather
than halted by U.S. recognition of the
PRC.
It is understandable that Bush, as former head of the American Institute of
Taiwan, would want to credit U.S. diplomats and government officials with
sponsoring Taiwan’s democratic development (one chapter even investigates
the impact of the U.S. Congress and
Taiwanese-Americans on this process).
Granted, this is a subject he knows well;
however, lest Taiwanese democracy be
mistaken as simply an American knockoff, even Bush is forced to admit that
these non-Taiwanese factors “made but
a tertiary contribution to the democratization of Taiwan” when compared to
the impact of Taiwanese reformers both
inside and outside of the Nationalist
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party. For better or worse, Taiwan’s democracy is completely homegrown.
To evaluate how Taiwan’s democracy
and the Sino-U.S. Cold War diplomacy
impacts relations today, Bush discusses
the four diplomatic communiqués and
congressional acts that have regulated
U.S.-PRC-Taiwanese relations, including the Shanghai communiqué (1972),
the U.S.-PRC normalization communiqué (1978), the Taiwan Relations Act
(1979), and the U.S.-PRC communiqué
on arms sales to Taiwan (1982). The
commitments included in these four
“sacred texts” were not trivial and have
created fixed constraints on Washington’s
and Beijing’s behavior. Although necessary to defeat the Soviets, these diplomatic agreements have often worked to
the PRC’s advantage in putting diplomatic pressure on Taiwan to accept its
“one country, two systems” formula.
As for what will happen in the future to
this “one China” conundrum, Bush
cautions that Taiwan’s recent democratic reforms have not given twelve
million voting Taiwanese their own seat
at the table in any future cross-strait
talks leading to Chinese reunification.
Democracy will make any satisfactory
political solution of the PRC-Taiwan
divide even more difficult to negotiate.
He cautions, therefore, that the “Taiwan and China positions are sufficiently at odds that they cannot be
papered over. If the stalemate is to be
broken peacefully, either Beijing will
have to abandon one country, two systems, or Taipei will have to accept it.”
Since neither of these options appears
likely, one is forced to conclude that
PRC-Taiwan reunification can only be
accomplished as a result of war.
BRUCE ELLEMAN

Naval War College
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Goldman, Emily O., and Leslie C. Eliason, eds. The
Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2003. 415pp. $75

This book offers a rich collection of research papers on very important topics: the much discussed revolution in
military affairs (RMA), and the less discussed diffusions of new military technology and the accompanying changes
in military doctrine to other countries.
The authors were carefully chosen experts in history, political science, and
sociology, who address the very important factors of national culture as they
affect the application of new military
technologies.
The product of a series of workshops,
this work owes a considerable debt to
the prodding of Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, who has
been encouraging scholarly analysis of
the full implications of the RMA.
Although recognizing the ambiguities
relating to the exact definition of such a
“revolution,” the book does not get
bogged down in the debate, but rather
directs its analysis to the sociological,
cultural, bureaucratic, intellectual, and
other processes by which such revolutions are, or are not, replicated. Military
weapons may spread through arms
sales, the commercial development of
“dual-use” technologies, or by simple
imitation, but the military doctrines appropriate to such new kinds of weaponry
sometimes do not spread so rapidly.
There are some very stimulating and
provocative historical case studies, including the foreign penetrations of the
past five centuries into South Asia, the
development of “blitzkrieg” armored
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